Limitless Boundary:
British Global Dominion During the Imperial Century (1815-1914)
By 1815, the British Empire appeared to be in decline. It consisted of the “remaining North American colonies” (in Canada); India; the Cape of Southern Africa; New South Wales, in Australia; and some scattered naval bases across the world. The heyday of the great diaspora, when masses of Britons voluntarily, and in some cases, unwillingly, migrated to and colonized, on behalf of the Crown, “temperate climates approximating Western Europe,” [1] seemed to be over. Yet by the latter part of the 19th century, the expansion of British hegemony surprised even those in power. After gaining control over critical economic hubs in Singapore (1818), the Falkland Islands (1833), greater New Zealand (1831), Aden (1839), Natal (1842), Hong Kong (1842), and Lagos (1861), the British Imperium was reinvigorated, and its generals and admirals led forays into Africa and the Asian subcontinent. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 marked the beginning of a campaign that ended in British “possession of a truly global empire on the eve of the First World War.” [2] Firm control over Malaya, Baluchistan, Upper Burma, and scores of South Pacific islands solidified the Crown’s dominion. A parallel, informal empire, “where the influence was considerable but the flag was never formally run up,” [3] included the ‘Ëœrepublics of South America’ and the decrepit, militarily weak empires of China, and ‘ËœTurkish and Persian sovereigns.’ [4]
The British imagined a well-oiled global system of government that administered economic, political, and cultural hegemony. In the 19th century, British capital powered the world commodity exchange. The English language, and as an extension, British culture, penetrated the societies of subjugated peoples. Superior military technology, and the world’s largest navy, insured British economic interests access to foreign markets. Loyal, impeccably trained civil servants kept the parts of the complex colonial machine attuned and functioning as a whole. For roughly a century, Britain controlled international commerce and dictated global discourse more effectively than any other empire in history.
While not necessarily “coterminous “‘”indeed at considerable odds'””with mankind,” [5] Britain’s grandiose vision of the globe as its private playing field forged a new national ethos at home, and revived a dying aristocratic culture. Influential thinkers as well as popular authors with a mass audience shaped public discourse, patriotic triumphalism, and the country’s self-image, fortifying the belief that global dominion was a British right. From the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the start of the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, to the First World War in 1914, the British crown successfully envelopped the planet in her oppressive tentacles'”subjugating millions of subjects to specific political, economic, and cultural philosophies.
But the colonial machine of the “Imperial Century” also had, one could say, a soul, which helped to legitimatize British imperialism. It was a deeply religious, Protestant conception of the world that underlay foreign policy, and its creation of a “hybrid institution encompassing a vast array of peoples, languages, and customs.” [6] British colonial agents were trained to think of themselves and to behave on their postings as secular missionaries, and they often received intensive training in native languages and customs, epitomized by the British Malay Police. [7] Writing on the Protestant politics of empire, Ronald Hyam observes:
The Protestant world-view made it possible for the British to see themselves as a chosen people, with God once more visible in history. Britain was the new Israel — The entire British expansionist enterprise overseas was infused with and energized by a profound sense of moral and religious purpose — There is one ‘Ëœparadigm shift’ above all others which stands out, and it arises directly out of a religious motivation: the attempt to maintain an ethical imperial policy… [8]
Through cooperation with local authorities and respect for, or at least lip service to, local customs, imperial officers were able to govern more effectively. Graham Greene’s depiction of foreign officers serving in Liberia, is particularly illustrative.
The Englishmen here didn’t talk about the ‘Ëœbloody blacks’ nor did they patronize or laugh at them; they had to deal with the real natives and not the Creole, and the real native was someone to love and admire — The Englishmen here were of a finer, subtler type than on the Coast; they were patriots in the sense that they cared for something in their country other than its externals; they couldn’t build their English corner with a few tin roofs and peeling posters and drinks at the bar.
— Beside the line Sergeant Penny Carlyle, DC’s messenger, swagger stick under arm, waited for us. Bare-legged and bare-footed — he led the way to the rest-house, squashed a beetle under his toes, clicked his bare heels and dismissed. [9]
The missionary zeal of colonial administrators and military officers was relatively sophisticated compared with, say, that of the Spanish conquerors of the New World, or the American frontiersmen, in their relations with indigenous populations. The British governed not by trying to obliterate, but by “co-opting and adapting [indigenous] social institutions.’ [10] This process resulted in an imperial state that was not completely British in style, color, or accent. Tolerance, however, had its limits; masters and subjects were never fully integrated (not to speak of equal) partners in a multicultural society. Rigid social hierarchy prevailed in British colonial states, as did a deeply engrained complacency about British superiority. Enlightened on a certain level, and moral in its way, the British Protestant world-view nevertheless worked to justify and advance imperial supremacy.
John Hobson’s conviction in Imperialism: A Study that “the imperialism of England is essentially though not exclusively an economic thing,” [11] is partially correct. The emergence of Britain as the world’s foremost ‘Ëœindustrial and commercial power,’ [12] following the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, set the Crown on a voracious quest for markets and raw materials. The drive to maintain its economic superiority dictated the drive for global political supremacy between 1815-1914. Willie Thompson, in Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914, states:
Dominating the entire structure were British production, British commerce and British financial services, and it might be added, British economic ideology, as free markets and free trade came to be perceived as the wave of the future — [13]
‘ËœFavorable forces’ [14] buoyed the British economic ship during the 1830’s. More than anyone else, British merchants benefited from the opening of trade in Brazil and Latin America following the Napoleonic War. Brazil eventually assumed the role of a British protectorate, albeit without official recognition. [15] The freeing of British trade from ‘Ëœchartered monopolies’ in India (1813), the ‘ËœNear East’ (1825), and China (1833), spurred private enterprise, and invigorated independent entrepreneurs. American economic development also directly benefited Great Britain'”as the shortest transatlantic route linking northern Europe to southern Europe, it became the main entry point for New World goods. “Britain became the main entrepot for the New World’s trade with the Old.” [16] A continental wartime blockade gave London the opportunity to surpass Amsterdam as the financial hub of Europe. A center for war loans and subsidies directly after the Napoleonic War, the British capital became a place for those seeking easy credit. “The supply of long credit on easy terms from London was the key to business with regions where the local financing of long distance trade was underdeveloped or lacking.” [17] However, the introduction of power-weaving in the 1830’s proved to be the most potent tool for British financiers. By swiftly undercutting competition in the commodities, British goods often hit new markets at ‘Ëœtwo hundred times cheaper than the local supply.’ [18]
By the early 1850’s, Great Britain was the ‘Ëœsole industrialized country in a non-industrialized world.’ The Crown exploited this unique advantage to become both a prime exporter and importer in the global marketplace. Free trade was ‘Ëœthe ideological sanctification for British industrial, commercial, and financial ascendancy.’ [19] Technological innovation, all of which was home-grown, expedited British economic control. The railroad, steam powered ocean travel, and the telegraph heightened efficiency and streamlined logistics to previously unimagined levels. Long-distances ceased to be daunting. Remote overseas markets were no longer inaccessible. All global commodities were readily within reach: wheat from the United States, copper from Chile, wool from Australia, beef from Argentina, mutton from New Zealand. [20] The subsequent British rail boom led to the creation of a massively lucrative foreign parts market. It was the bandwagon of an enterprise that British capital vigorously jumped on, “exporting not only the funds but often the rails, equipment, rolling stock and labor force as well.”
As railway construction slowed in the 1850’s, British capitalists increasingly sought out foreign markets, specifically in India and settlement colonies. [21] The exportation of railway technology to newly colonized lands enabled the economic development of mines, plantations, and ranches that were previously unviable. No other European power was embarking on formal colonial expeditions during the 1850’s and 1860’s, and that vacuum of competition further advanced Britain’s economic triumph, and the Crown’s rapid acquisition of foreign capital. [22]
The speed with which British merchants moved out to search for new business, their success in constructing new commercial connections and their dominant position in long distance trade made Britain the great economic power of the ninetieth-century world. [23]
Policy during the ‘ËœImperial Century’ shifted from a mercantilistic style of imperialism from the pre Napoleonic War years to informal influence during the mid 1800’s, to the re-embrace of formal empire by the early 1880’s. [24] When predatory economic practices and diplomatic pressure failed, armed coercion was used to “modify external trade relations so as to give British commercial entrepreneurs a free hand, enabling them to convert these polities into economic colonies and even to determine the direction of their productive activity.” [25] The Crown resorted to violent means of financial control in China, the Ottoman empire, and in weakened Spanish states in South America, specifically Argentina.
In the early nineteenth century, China was in a state of economic and social decay. British colonists applied ‘Ëœjudicious military force,’ or threatened it, to gain economic and political concessions from the militarily inferior Chinese. [26] After the Chinese government seized British opium in an attempt to protect its population from the scourges of addiction, (the official pretext behind The First Opium War, among many more complex reasons for that action), Crown forces arrived in 1840 to demand reparations and gain ‘Ëœcommercial concessions.’ [27] The British show of force was successful. Following the treaty of Nanking in 1842, a handful of ports were opened. Operating with total impunity, British merchants were no longer restricted to foreigner enclaves in Canton. This measure “became a cornerstone of informal British influence in China,” effectively elevating British merchants and missionaries above the law. The treaty also set import tariffs at 5 percent and ceded Hong Kong to the Crown. [28] British access to Chinese ports grew after the Second Opium War (1856-60), as well as their access to the interior. Royal naval supremacy was on full display'”roughly forty gun boats patrolled Chinese coasts and rivers to protect the Crown’s interests. Such vigilance was a result of the widely held belief among colonial administrators that “commercial access to China could only be gained through the consular enclaves and extraterritorial rights to which Peking agreed, both of them subject to local attrition.” [29] British dealings with the Ch’ing dynasty are representative of the ‘Ëœinextricable link between profit and power’ that marked British global conquests throughout the century. [30] Indian grown opium and cotton were sent to China to buy tea and silk. As opium was a government monopoly, and revenue consisted of 1/5 of the Indian Royal Government’s income, exports rose exponentially. [31] The only consideration was profit, Chinese wellbeing was disregarded.
An observer of the Imperial Century from a distant galaxy might have to conclude that Britain’s emergence as an unchallenged superpower was the result of an exceptional alignment of favorable stars. In 2011, one might also use a different image: a synergy of forces was at work, in Britain, that produced a unique concentration of energy and purpose which spread outwards in a wake like a controlled tsunami. The sovereign power of the British military secured the freedom of its capitalists to penetrate remote parts of the globe and guarded their interests there. That power was, in turn, underwritten by the inventiveness of British scientists and engineers whose technological innovations transformed the logistics of travel, conquest, industry, and communication. The confidence that was bred by decades of prosperity enhanced the cohesiveness of British society at home and the loyalty of its representatives abroad. Capitalism and patriotism were, in turn, strengthened by the Protestant ethos–a gospel of success'”and by the moralism of Victorian culture. Religious ideals provided a high-minded rationale for the nation’s “civilizing mission.” The discipline and competitiveness of British schools turned out a class of able, adaptable civil servants and officers, and the natural restlessness of an island people found its outlet in pioneering entrepreneurship. Free trade was a sacred principle to the British of the Imperial Century, but it also resembled the black jack table in the high roller’s suite of a casino. Any player with an ante was welcome to join the game, but the dealer set the rules, the house had an unbeatable advantage'”and the decks were stacked.
Bibliography
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 2006. Print.
Cain, Peter J., and Anthony G. Hopkins. British Imperialism: 1688 – 2000. Harlow [u.a.: Longman, 2009. Print.
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system, 1830-1970. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print.
Freeman, Michael J. Railways and the Victorian Imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1999. Print.
Greene, Graham. Journey without Maps. New York: Penguin, 2006. Print.
Hobson, J. A. Imperialism a Study. New York: Gordon, 1975. Print.
Hyam, Ronald. Understanding the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print.
Stockwell, A.J., (1992), Policing during the Malayan Emergency, 1948- 1960: Communism, Communalism and Decolonisation, in David Anderson and David Killingray (eds), Policing and Decolonisation, pp 105-126. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Parsons, Timothy. The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914: a World History Perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Print.
Thompson, Willie. Global Expansion: Britain and Its Empire, 1870-1914. London: Pluto, 1999. Print.
[1] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[2] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[3] Hyam, Ronald, Understanding the British Empire
[4] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[5] Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities
[6] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[7] Stockwell, A.J. Policing During the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960
[8] Hyam, Ronald, Understanding the British Empire
[9] Greene, Graham, Journey Without Maps
[10] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[11] Hobson, John, Imperialism; A Study
[12] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective,
[13] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[14] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[15] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[16] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-System
[17] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[18] “”
[19] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[20] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[21] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[22] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[23] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[24] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[25] Thompson, Willie, Global Expansion; Britain and its Empire, 1870-1914
[26] Cain, Peter J., and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688 – 2000
[27] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[28] Parsons, Timothy, The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective
[29] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[30] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
[31] Darwin, John. The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-system
